Laws of Nature, Natural History, and the Description of the World by McAllister, J.W.
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, VOL. 11, NO. 3, 1997 245
ARTICLE
Laws of nature, natural history, and the
description of the world
JAMES W. MCALLISTER
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Leiden, The Netherlands
Abstract The modern sciences are divided into two groups: law-formulating and natural
historical sciences. Sciences of both groups aim at describing the world, but they do so differently.
Whereas the natural historical sciences produce "transcriptions " intended to be literally true of
actual occurrences, laws of nature are expressive symbols of aspects of the world. The
relationship between laws and the world thus resembles that between the symbols of classical
iconography and the objects for which they stand. The natural historical approach was founded
by Aristotle and is retained in such present-day sciences as botany. Modern physics differenti-
ated itself from the natural historical sciences and developed a symbolizing approach at the
hands of Galileo and Descartes. Our knowledge of the physical domain ù provided by two
disciplines: the law-formulating science of physics and a natural historical science on which we
depend in the everyday manipulation of our surroundings.
1. Law-formulating and natural historical sciences
The modern sciences are divided into two groups, denned by the form of the knowledge
that they characteristically produce. Sciences of one group characteristically produce
knowledge in the form of the "law of nature"—a concise statement of universal scope,
frequently expressed as a mathematical equation. Sciences of the other group character-
istically produce knowledge in the form of the singular statement (a statement attribut-
ing a particular property to an individual place, time, or entity) and the low-level
generalization, which may be considered as a conjunction of singular statements.
Modern physics is a science of the first group. Admittedly, physics produces some
knowledge in forms other than that of the law of nature: experimental reports and
explanatory models, for example. But the law of nature is the most characteristic
product of physics, and the achievement that is most highly regarded by physicists.
Sciences of the second group include most branches of biological, earth, and engineer-
ing science. Although these sciences occasionally formulate statements called laws, such
as Mendel's laws and the Hardy-Weinberg law in population genetics (Ruse, 1977,
pp. 89-113), the knowledge that they produce is for a much greater part expressed in
singular statements and low-level generalizations, such as descriptions of events in
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evolutionary history and of the morphology, physiology, and behaviour of organisms
(Mayr, 1985, pp. 53-54).
I shall call sciences of these groups the "law-formulating" and the "natural
historical" sciences, respectively. The aim of this paper is to investigate the differences
between the outputs of the sciences of these two sorts, and assess their implications for
our overall view of science.
Traditionally, two explanations have been offered for the coexistence of natural
historical and law-formulating sciences. Auguste Comte (1830-1842, vol. I, pp. 47-95)
suggested that the law-formulating phase represents a more advanced stage in the
development of a science than the natural historical phase. Every science originates as
a natural historical discipline and progresses to formulate laws: physics has already
undergone this development, whereas the younger science of biology must still do so.
More recently, J. J. C. Smart (1963, pp. 50-61) suggested that the world contains two
classes of entities: natural kinds such as chemical elements, which lend themselves to
description by universal laws, and historical individuals such as the planet Mars, which
lend themselves to description only by singular statements and low-level generalizations.
We need sciences of both kinds in order to describe entities of both sorts. I accept
neither Comte's nor Smart's explanation, and in this paper will develop an alternative
account of the coexistence of the natural historical and law-formulating sciences.
As will already be clear, my usage of the term "law of nature" differs from that of
some other writers. For D. H. Mellor (1990, pp. 159-160), for example, a "law of
nature" is an objective feature of the world, whereas a statement that describes such a
feature is a "law statement". My "law of nature" is what Mellor calls "law statement";
I would choose quite another term—perhaps "phenomenon" or "regularity"—for the
feature of the world that such a statement purports to describe. My usage is that of many
scientists, who speak of laws of nature as being formulated, tested, and corroborated:
such expressions make sense only if laws have the status of statements.
2. The knowledge-world relationship in the sciences
Both the law-formulating and the natural historical sciences are regarded by their
practitioners and by most philosophers as, in some sense, describing the world.
However, the relationships in which the characteristic outputs of the law-formulating
and natural historical sciences stand to the world differ. These relationships can be
analyzed into aspects that I shall call "extensional" and "intensional".
Under the extensional aspect, the singular statements and low-level generalizations
characteristically produced by the natural historical sciences aim to specify nothing other
than actual occurrences, i.e. what happens in the world. I do not suggest that these
statements contain only observational predicates: the natural historical sciences make
probably no less use of theoretical predicates than do any other sciences. Instead, what
I claim is that in the natural historical sciences the use to which all predicates—both
observational and theoretical—are put is the specification of nothing other than actual
occurrences. This feature of the natural historical sciences might initially seem common-
place; but we shall soon see that the law-formulating sciences do not share this aim.
Under the intensional aspect, the statements produced as knowledge by the natural
historical sciences are intended to approximate as closely as possible a literally true
account of events. In particular, they are intended to render as fully as possible the
variety and detail of the world. Of course, no account of finite length will reproduce the
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world in full; but practitioners of the natural historical sciences strive to approach this
aim as closely as possible.
Let us now move to the relationship in which laws of nature stand to the world.
Take first the extensional aspect. Laws of nature—in so far as they are satisfied at
all—are satisfied not only by actual states of affairs, but also by an infinite number of
other possible states of affairs. This is because laws of nature state not what there
actually is, but rather constraints on what there can be. For instance, laws of nature
entail that the universe may contain matter in the liquid state, stable planetary systems,
and forms of life; but they do not specify whether our universe is one that actually
contains any of these entities.
In fact, successive laws of nature show a decreasing capacity to individuate actual
states of affairs from among possible ones. The customary development in physics is for
one law of nature to be superseded by another that has wider scope. The statement that
the later law has wider scope means that the earlier law can be deduced from a
conjunction of the later law and some special assumptions. In turn, this means that the
occurrences envisaged as possible by the earlier law form a subset of the occurrences
envisaged as possible by the later law. So the later law has a lesser capacity than the
earlier law to individuate actual occurrences from among possible ones. For example,
Kepler's laws of planetary motion were superseded by Newton's law of gravitation,
which has wider scope. Kepler's laws state that the earth moves in an ellipse. As long
as the gravitational influence of other bodies is disregarded, Newton's inverse-square law
entails that the earth moves in a conic section: an ellipse, a parabola, or a hyperbola.
Newton's law thus contains less, not more, information about the actual motion of the
earth than do Kepler's laws. There are reasons for preferring Newton's law to Kepler's
laws, but its power to identify which possible states of affairs are actual is not one of
them.
Lastly, the intensional aspects of laws of nature. As Michael Scriven (1961), Nancy
Cartwright (1983, pp. 54-73), and others have noted, while laws of nature may be true
of an idealization of phenomena, they are strictly speaking not true of actual occur-
rences: they are only approximately true of actual occurrences. This claim holds as
much for "experimental" laws supposed to be induced from bodies of data, such as
Boyle's law of gases, as for "theoretical" laws derived from high-level principles, such as
Newton's laws of motion. (The distinction is drawn by, among others, Nagel, 1961,
pp. 79-81.)
The claim that laws of nature are not true of actual occurrences does not depend
on any particularly scepticist or relativist view of science: on the contrary, it is
established by what we call laws of nature themselves. The descriptions of occurrences
given by most laws of nature are inconsistent with those of other laws. For example, the
description of occurrences given by Newton's law of gravitation is inconsistent with that
of Kepler's laws of planetary motion, since, in conjunction with the true statement that
the universe contains more than two bodies, Newton's law entails that planets do not
move in ellipses; it is inconsistent with that of Galileo's law of free fall, since Newton's
law entails that the acceleration of a falling body varies with altitude; and it is
inconsistent with that of Einstein's law of gravitation, since, in conjunction with various
true statements about the solar system, Einstein's law entails that the perihelion of
Mercury precesses at a certain rate. In the light of their logical relations with one another
we can rule out, even without consulting empirical data, that all the descriptions of
occurrences given by laws are accurate: laws of nature systematically discredit each other
as accurate descriptions of occurrences. This is a further respect in which laws of nature
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differ from the low-level generalizations produced by the natural historical sciences,
which are designed to be consistent with one another.
Of course, there are partial defences that may be given of laws of nature in regard
of the accuracy of their descriptions of occurrences. For instance, one may argue that
their descriptions of occurrences are only ever claimed to be true to within a certain limit
of approximation, and that this limit is smaller for laws formulated more recently. These
claims may be justified. But my intent here is to draw attention to the disparity in the
degrees to which the natural historical and the law-formulating sciences attain accuracy
of description of occurrences. In the low-level generalizations that they produce, the
natural historical sciences consistently attain very high degrees of accuracy in descrip-
tions of occurrences; the characteristic products of the law-formulating sciences, laws of
nature, find that standard difficult to match.
3. In what sense do laws of nature describe the world?
Thus, while the aim of both the natural historical and the law-formulating sciences is
description of the world, the ways in which they set about this task differ. The natural
historical sciences discharge the task in a way that may be characterized as straight-
forward: they record the outcomes of observations, striving to preserve all the detail
possible. By comparison, the law-formulating sciences take a cavalier attitude towards
detail. They are willing to set aside large amounts of information about actual occur-
rences—the essence of the accounts of the world produced by the natural historical
sciences—in order to formulate expressions that constitute, at best, an approximate
description of every member of a set of universes to which ours belongs.
How should this difference between laws of nature and the low-level generalizations
produced by the natural historical sciences be reflected in our view of the sciences? Two
options suggest themselves. The first is to regard the law-formulating sciences as aiming
to describe the world in the same sense as the natural historical sciences, but
as accomplishing this task much less well. The second option is to regard the law-
formulating sciences as aiming to describe the world in a sense different from the natural
historical sciences.
The first of these options is attractively iconoclastic. By portraying natural historical
sciences such as botany as more successful than law-formulating sciences such as
physics, it inverts Comte's hierarchy. In view of the great value attached to laws of
nature, however, I fear that this interpretation overlooks some aspect of them. Laws of
nature are among the most highly esteemed products of our culture: they would not
have this status if they were merely second-best to low-level generalizations. I therefore
incline to the second option, that of regarding the law-formulating sciences as aiming to
describe the world in a sense different from the natural historical sciences. As the natural
historical sciences demonstrate, the goal of accurate description of occurrences is
attained fairly easily, by compiling low-level generalizations about them. If physics and
similar sciences persist in formulating laws of nature, which stand to data points in the
loose relationship that I have delineated, it must be that accurate recording of occur-
rences is not their overriding intent. They must, in other words, be aiming at describing
the world in some other sense.
In what sense, then, do laws of nature describe the world? The literature offers
some standard answers to this question; though, since the question is seldom posed
explicitly, the contributions to which I refer are not generally presented as answers to it.
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Among the standard answers are four: that laws of nature describe the world in the sense
of providing an inventory of universal regularities; that laws give of the world a modal
description, i.e. one that attributes necessity to correlations among events; that laws
describe the world in the sense of giving a predictive or projective account of it; and that
laws offer explanations of occurrences. I examine these answers in the remainder of this
section.
First, the suggestion that laws of nature describe the world in the sense of providing
an inventory of universal regularities. According to a popular argument (advanced by,
for example, Wigner, 1964, pp. 38-42), the configuration of a physical system at any
time is determined jointly by two factors: universal regularities, and the system's
configuration at a previous time, or "initial conditions". The specification of initial
conditions falls outside the scope of laws of nature—in fact, the initial conditions of
physical systems are the typical subject matter of natural historical sciences. But laws of
nature can and do describe the universal regularities that the world contains.
This argument presupposes a partition of facts into "facts pertaining to initial
conditions" (which lie beyond the scope of laws) and "facts pertaining to regularities"
(which laws of nature can be expected to describe). But any partition of facts into these
categories is relative to a physical system: what counts as a fact pertaining to initial
conditions relative to one system counts as a fact pertaining to regularities relative to
another. Consider the following example. It is often said that, while Newton's laws in
celestial mechanics can tell us the regularities of the planets' motions (such as the
relation between the velocity of a planet and its distance from the sun), it is unfair to
ask them the mean radius of the orbit of Mars, say: a parameter such as this, it is
explained, depends on the initial conditions of the solar system rather than on universal
regularities, and therefore lies beyond the scope of laws of nature. But if we transferred
our attention from the solar system to a particular other physical system, we would
consider that the orbital parameters of Mars had indeed been determined by universal
regularities. This other physical system to which I refer is the protosun, the rotating
incandescent mass of gas from which lumps were flung off that cooled and solidified to
form the planets. A Newtonian model of that system would allocate facts about the early
motion of Mars not to the category of initial conditions, but to the category of
(consequences of) universal regularities. After all, on Newtonian theory, every rotating
mass of gas with the same physical properties as the protosun would yield a planet
having the orbital parameters of Mars.
If there is no standpoint-independent partition of facts into "facts pertaining to
regularities" and "facts pertaining to initial conditions", there exists no task "to specify
the universal regularities of the world" distinct from the task of recording facts about the
world generally. Consequently, the suggestion that laws of nature describe the world in
the sense of providing an inventory of universal regularities fails to define a task for laws
of nature to discharge.
Second, the suggestion that laws of nature give a modal description of the world,
or a description attributing necessity to correlations among events. According to this
suggestion, the statement that such-and-such events occur differs from the statement
that these events occur necessarily; and a law is a statement of the latter kind. In fact,
this claim is untrue. A law of nature does not describe events as occurring as a matter
of necessity: it describes events, or at least purports to. It is a particular reading of a law
that attributes necessity to the events that the law describes. This may be surmised, if
from no other evidence, from the fact that some philosophers offer so-called regularity
interpretations of laws (reviewed by Weinert, 1995, pp. 31-39), in which no necessity is
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attributed to correlations among events. So it cannot be said that the description that
laws of nature give of the world is intrinsically modal.
Third, the suggestion that laws of nature describe the world in the sense of giving
a predictive or projective account of it. This suggestion rests on the belief that laws allow
us accurately to predict unobserved occurrences, often extended into a belief that
knowledge in the form of laws confers technological mastery over natural phenomena.
In reality, laws are not a good source of determinate predictions of actual occurrences,
especially by comparison with lower-level generalizations. For one thing, many laws of
nature are too indeterminate to predict events. Moreover, this predictive indeterminacy
is greatest for laws that are most fundamental—in other words, for the laws that enjoy
the greatest esteem among physicists and philosophers. As an example, consider the
Dirac equation, which is the description offered by quantum physics of the behaviour of
systems of elementary particles. As even Stephen Hawking (1993, pp. 50-51)—who
holds laws of nature in high regard—acknowledges, the only system for which the Dirac
equation directly yields predictions of any appreciable precision is one of the simplest to
which it applies, the hydrogen atom. For systems moderately more complex than the
hydrogen atom, such as large molecules, the Dirac equation offers only loose predic-
tions, and only when conjoined with nonlawlike and in some cases nonrigorous
assumptions about their behaviour; for systems much more complex than the hydrogen
atom, such as the simplest living organisms, the Dirac equation offers no predictions
whatever. Where we speak of a prediction being drawn from the Dirac equation,
therefore, this prediction in fact usually derives from a compound structure that includes
low-level generalizations about systems of elementary particles.
Even clearer is the incapacity of laws of nature to confer mastery over natural
phenomena. It is from low-level generalizations such as those of engineering science,
rather than laws of nature such as Dirac's equation, that our degree of mastery over
natural phenomena derives (Keller, 1984).
Lastly, the suggestion that laws of nature describe the world in the sense of giving
explanations of phenomena. This suggestion appears plausible as long as explanation is
seen as involving laws: for instance, if explaining an event is seen as inferring a statement
describing the event from a lawlike statement, as on the deductive-nomological model.
But alternative accounts of explanation attribute no crucial role to laws. For instance,
according to the narrative model (Goudge, 1961, pp. 70-79), an explanation is a
narrative that sets the explanandum into context, conveying an understanding of how it
came to pass. On this model, which coheres with our intuitions about what amounts to
a good explanation more closely than the deductive-nomological model, citing a law of
nature is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the success of an explanation.
This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the natural historical sciences routinely give
accounts of events—the extinction of a species or the formation of a volcano, for
instance—that involve no laws but constitute intuitively successful explanations.
4. Laws of nature as expressive symbols of the world
The standard answers to the question, "In what sense do laws of nature describe the
world?", are therefore unconvincing. The alternative answer that I now advance invokes
the notion of expressive symbol.
I emphasize from the outset the distinction between expressive and conventional
symbols. Conventional symbols, such as "n" and "e" in mathematics, are signs that
stand to their objects in a purely arbitrary relation. In contrast, an expressive symbol is
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a sign that depicts some properties of the object for which it stands—or, what amounts
o the same thing, depicts that object. The manner of depiction is almost invariably
metaphorical rather than literal. Examples of expressive symbols are a symbol of
cunning consisting of the picture of a fox and a symbol of mortality consisting of the
picture of a bubble. The objects "cunning" and "mortality" are depicted by these
symbols, albeit in a metaphorical way, in virtue of the fact that foxes are cunning and
bubbles are ephemeral.
Expressive symbols have the following three characteristics, which derive from their
definition. First, since a sign must depict properties of an object in order to be an
expressive symbol of it, whether a particular sign is a given object's expressive symbol
is determined at least partly by matters of fact, namely the properties of the object and
of the sign, and not purely by a stipulation. For example, whether a picture of a fox can
serve as an expressive symbol of cunning is determined partly by facts about the
attribute of cunning and the behaviour of foxes: if foxes behaved as rabbits do, then a
picture of a fox would not be an expressive symbol of cunning. My claim that whether
something is an appropriate expressive symbol of a given object depends partly on
matters of fact is not refuted by the observation that most expressive symbols depict
their objects metaphorically rather than literally. After all, whether something is an apt
metaphor for an object is also determined partly by matters of fact.
Second, because of this, it is not the case that any sign is as appropriate an
expressive symbol of a given object as any other sign. From this it follows that we cannot
choose at whim a sign to be the expressive symbol of a given object. For example, a
picture of a bubble is not equally adequate an expressive symbol of cunning as a picture
of a fox.
Third, since expressive symbols depict properties of their objects, an expressive
symbol can convey information about its object: information about an object can be
encoded in an expressive symbol by one person and retrieved from it by another. Thus,
if a sign is presented to us as an expressive symbol, we can acquire further information
about the object for which it stands. In particular, under favourable circumstances, by
examining an expressive symbol we can infer for which object it stands. For example,
if we are informed that a picture of a fox is an appropriate expressive symbol of a given
person (for example, by being told "This person is a fox"), then we can infer some of
that person's attributes. Given the metaphorical nature of most expressive symbols,
extracting information about an object from an expressive symbol of it generally involves
interpreting the symbol as one would a metaphor, rather than straightforwardly reading
off the properties of the object.
Further examples of expressive symbols are the personifications of concepts found
in classical iconography, such as lustitia, Cupid, and Mars. A portrayal of lustitia, with
blindfold, balance, and sword, expresses information about the concept of justice, which
a beholder of this symbol can extract. The discipline of iconology depends on this fact,
as well as on the fact that, consequently, beholders can recognize a given expressive
symbol as standing for one object rather than another (Panofsky, 1939; Gombrich,
1965, 1972).
The central claim of this paper is that laws of nature are expressive symbols of the
world or of aspects of it, and stand to the world in the way in which other expressive
symbols stand to their objects—in the way in which, for example, lustitia stands to the
concept of justice. In support of this claim, I cite the differences between the knowl-
edge-world relationship in the natural historical and law-formulating sciences. A natural
historical science aims at compiling a set of propositions that, for every occurrence of a
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given class, includes a proposition that is literally true of that occurrence. Call such a
set of propositions a "transcription" of occurrences. There is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the component propositions of a completed transcription and occur-
rences of the relevant class. A completed transcription is thus as repetitive and
differentiated as the occurrences of which it is a rendering; it is neither intended nor apt
to be concise or simple. In contrast, a law of nature is a concise and simple formula that
is taken to stand for some feature of the world. It is not, and not required to be, literally
true of individual occurrences. Indeed, a law of nature has little internal structure, so
there is no possibility of a one-to-one correspondence between constituent parts of it
and individual occurrences. Rather, a law captures its object in a global or holistic
manner. Examples of laws in which these features are evident are the Schrödinger
equation and especially the so-called Schrödinger equation of the universe (Hawking,
1987).
The relationship between laws of nature and the world, which I have just described,
closely resembles the relationship between expressive symbols and the objects for which
they stand, such as that between lustitia and justice. An expressive symbol is a concise
and simple sign that is taken to stand for some feature of the world. It is not required
to shed light on individual instances: for example, lustitia contains no information about
what is just in a particular case. Indeed, like laws of nature, expressive symbols have
little internal structure, and are thus unsuited to refer individually to separate occur-
rences. Rather, a symbol depicts its object in a global or holistic manner. The similarity
between laws of nature and expressive symbols cannot be rejected on the grounds that
the latter are merely conventional or do not depict objects: as we have seen, expressive
symbols differ from conventional symbols precisely in depicting properties of the objects
for which they stand.
This account explains the difference between the ways in which we extract
information from the output of sciences of the two sorts. The output of the natural
historical sciences delivers the information that it contains gradually, upon being
scanned progressively; in contrast, a law of nature delivers information in a flash, upon
being interpreted according to some key. This is exactly the manner in which an
expressive symbol delivers information about its object.
This account explains also the differences in ethos or value system between the
natural historical and the law-formulating sciences. The highest value recognized by the
natural historical sciences is literal truth about individual occurrences: the fact that
pursuit of this value requires accounts of the world to be produced that are increasingly
long and intricate is not regarded as an excessive burden. The law-formulating sciences
do not hold literal truth about actual occurrences as a high value: conciseness and
simplicity rank much more highly. This too accords precisely with what we expect of
expressive symbols.
The above analysis should alter our view of concepts, such as "truth" and
"explanation", to which we refer in assessing the degree of adequacy of descriptions.
Because the relationship in which a successful symbol stands to the world is unlike that
in which a successful transcription stands to the world, the properties in virtue of which
a law of nature is true or constitutes an explanation cannot be identical to the properties
in virtue of which a transcription is true or constitutes an explanation. This view of truth
is not relativism: truth may still be absolute within each mode of description. This allows
us to explain why the realism-instrumentalism dispute arises more strongly in respect to
physics than to, say, biology: the relationship that an expressive symbol has to the world
is looser and more metaphorical than that of a transcription.
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5. The rise of physics as a law-formulating science
On my view, the modern sciences belong to two groups that describe the world in
different senses of the term: in the senses of "transcribing" and "symbolizing" it. What
are the origins of this division?
Today's natural historical sciences are descendants of disciplines founded by
Aristotle and his immediate followers, by which they believed the world could be
investigated scientifically. These disciplines—whose practice must be distinguished from
the heavily conceptualist theory of apodeictic or demonstrative science that Aristotle
expounded in the Posterior Analytics (Barnes, 1969)—aimed to describe actual occur-
rences with as much accuracy as possible. They held detail in high respect and
mistrusted abstraction and idealization, which divert attention from the description of
actual occurrences. This ethos is embodied in, for instance, Aristotelian botany, which
was founded by Aristotle's most important direct pupil, Theophrastus of Eresus. This
science aimed at providing detailed and accurate descriptions of actual flora, with no
abstraction and idealization. The ethos of the science of Theophrastus is maintained in
the botany of today.
Aristotle and his immediate followers applied the natural historical approach not
only in biological disciplines, but also in the study of inanimate objects. Aristotelian
physical science, like Aristotelian botany, aims to describe actual occurrences with as
much accuracy and detail as possible, and mistrusts abstraction, idealization, and high
levels of generalization.
By the seventeenth century, natural philosophers calling themselves Aristotelian had
departed in two respects from the methods used by Aristotle and his immediate
followers. First, they envisaged the proper method of natural philosophy no longer as the
cautious descriptive procedure of the natural historical approach, but rather as demon-
stration on the model of the Posterior Analytics. Second, they prescribed that contribu-
tions to natural philosophy be judged largely on their accord with the writings of
Aristotle and other authorities. Despite these aberrations, many sciences continued to
pursue the true natural historical approach in the early seventeenth century (Levine,
1983).
The natural historical approach was not without alternatives: Pythagoras, Plato, and
their followers theorized a different manner of describing the world. In their approach,
individual actual occurrences were paid less attention: it was more important to capture
features of the world as a whole in concise and comprehensive symbols. The many
sixteenth-century practitioners of astronomy and mechanics—such as Nicholas Coperni-
cus and Simon Stevin—who depicted the world as manifesting harmonics, symmetries,
proportions, and ratios were to a large extent pursuing this symbolizing approach. In the
seventeenth century, these vague notions were formalized into the mathematical expres-
sions that would become known as laws of nature. In astronomy, Johannes Kepler
progressed from the project of formulating geometrical symbolism of the cosmos in the
Mysterium cosmographicum of 1596 to that of formulating mathematical laws of nature in
the Asmmomia nova of 1609; in mechanics, Galileo Galilei, René Descartes, and others
suggested that the aim of accurately describing actual occurrences should be forsaken for
the formulation of laws.
Galileo and Descartes recognized that laws of nature would not make accurate
descriptions of actual occurrences. I suggested in section 2 that laws of nature are
precluded from being good descriptions of actual occurrences by an extensional feature
(their compatibility with an indefinitely large number of nonactual occurrences) and an
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intensional feature (their inaccuracy about actual occurrences). Galileo and Descartes
recognized these two features of laws of nature explicitly—though, because of their
different points of departure, they did not dwell on each equally. Descartes, who
proposed that laws of nature be formulated by deduction from more general principles,
recognized more clearly the incapacity of laws of nature to individuate actual occur-
rences from among possible ones:
I must [...] admit that the power of nature is so ample and so vast, and these
principles so simple and so general, that I notice hardly any particular effect of
which I do not know at once that it can be deduced from the principles in
many different ways; and my greatest difficulty is usually to discover in which
of these ways it depends on them. (Descartes, 1637, p. 144)
In contrast, Galileo, who proposed to formulate laws of nature by a partly empirical
route, perceived more clearly the inaccuracy of laws of nature about actual occurrences.
In the Discorsi, the Aristotelian spokesman Simplicio criticizes the concise statements of
universal scope produced by Salviati on the grounds that it was "highly improbable that
anything demonstrated from such fickle assumptions can ever be verified in actual
experiments." Salviati, who is Galileo's mouthpiece, replies:
All the difficulties and objections you advance are so well founded that I deem
it impossible to remove them. For my part, I grant them all, as I believe our
Author would also concede them. I admit that the conclusions demonstrated
in the abstract are altered in the concrete, and are so falsified that horizontal
[motion] is not equable; nor does natural acceleration occur [exactly] in the
ratio assumed; nor is the line of the projectile parabolic, and so on. (Galileo,
1638, p. 223; interpolations by Drake)
The diffidence of Galileo and Descartes towards actual occurrences is amply
justified: actual occurrences are in markedly closer agreement with the output of
Aristotelian physics than with that of Galilean or Cartesian physics. For instance, the
free fall of bodies under everyday conditions near the surface of the earth and the
movement of objects against friction are described more accurately by Aristotelian
accounts, which are alert to the effects of the weight and shape of bodies, than by
Galileo's laws (Feinberg, 1965; Adler & Coulter, 1975). While they recognized the
shortcomings of laws of nature as descriptions of actual occurrences, Galileo and
Descartes did not regard these shortcomings as nullifying the value of laws. This is
because they regarded a law of nature as expressing a truth not of actual occurrences,
but of an aspect of nature (which they sometimes called "phenomenon") in its entirety
in symbolic form.
Since the sources of empirical evidence that were then canonical—straightforward
reports of actual occurrences—tended to support Aristotelian accounts of the physical
world sooner than their own, the advocates of the law-formulating approach were
compelled to justify their laws by other means. They first cast doubt on the worth of
observations of actual occurrences. Galileo insisted that espcrienze of actual occurrences
were untrustworthy as sources of knowledge unless they were scnsate, or heavily idealized
(Koertge, 1977); Descartes enrolled scepticism to suggest that actual occurrences are
what we know least well, if by "knowledge" we mean the apprehension of something
that he called "clear and distinct ideas" (Sakellariadis, 1982). According to these
arguments, the manifest incapacity of laws to recover everyday experience is not a reason
for dissatisfaction with them.
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In place of reports of actual occurrences, the advocates of the law-formulating
approach proposed experiment as a new source of evidence in science. In Aristotelian
natural philosophy, experiment urn had denoted nothing more than an experience of
something. Practitioners of the law-formulating approach redefined the term to denote
a trial that differed from everyday experience in two respects: the contrived circum-
stances of its occurrence and the convention that its outcome may be reported
selectively. Where even experiments failed to support laws of nature, advocates of the
law-formulating approach turned to sources of justification still further removed from
everyday experience: Galileo claimed that laws of mechanics could be established by
thought experiment (McAllister, 1996), while Descartes argued that the attributes of
God assured us of the truth of his laws of optics.
The question remains why Galileo, Descartes, and others resolved to found a
discipline of this new type. The suggestion that knowledge of the world may take the
form of compact symbols that stand to phenomena in a global or holistic relation, and
whose construction does not require meticulous acquaintance with actual occurrences,
can have great charm. This charm would act more powerfully on thinkers persuaded, as
by Neoplatonism, that actual occurrences are an only imperfect reflection of some
underlying reality, and that fundamental knowledge is knowledge of this underlying
reality rather than of occurrences (Koyré, 1968, pp. 16-43).
Following its inauguration in mechanics, the law-formulating approach spread
gradually to other branches of physical science. For instance, investigations of electricity
adopted the law-formulating approach in the 1780s, with the enunciation of such
formulae as Coulomb's law of electrostatic attraction.
6. The coexistence of natural historical and law-formulating sciences
The fact that we possess many laws of nature relating to physical phenomena has
fostered the belief that the entirety of our present-day scientific knowledge about the
physical domain is supplied by the law-formulating science of modern physics. This
belief is supported by historians of the scientific revolution, who generally portray the
rise of the law-formulating approach as a reform of physics, after which physicists ceased
to practise the natural historical version of the discipline.
This belief is far from the truth. In fact, we retain today very extensive knowledge
about the physical world in the form of natural history. Especially important is our
knowledge in the form of singular statements and low-level generalizations about the
physical apparatus with which we deal, both in homely surroundings and in the practice
of experimental physics. This body of knowledge derives, I suggest, from a natural
historical science about the physical world, distinct from physics. After all, the ethos and
output of this discipline are quite unlike those of physics. In common with all other
natural historical sciences, this discipline attaches the highest value to accuracy of
description about actual occurrences in full reflection of their variety; it regards
knowledge in the form of laws of nature—rightly—as too theoretical and academic to be
applicable in any realistic sense. This discipline closely resembles the science that was
called "physics" before this name was appropriated by Galileo and Descartes for their
law-formulating science of the physical domain. Indeed, this discipline holds to many of
the claims of Aristotelian physics (Clement, 1983): in this discipline it counts as
knowledge, for instance, that bodies of different weights and shapes near the surface of
the earth fall at different speeds under gravity, and that it is generally necessary to
continue to apply a force to a body if it is to remain in a state of motion.
256 j. w. MCAI.I.ISTHR
The existence of this natural historical science of the physical domain is frequently
overlooked, because of its low visibility and intellectual status: it is practised not by
theoreticians, but by laboratory technicians, engineers and householders, and its output
is seldom recorded in writing (Shapin, 1989). Nonetheless, this discipline is essential for
our interaction with the physical world and indeed for the practice of law-formulating
physics.
Law-formulating and natural historical sciences coexist in other domains too. I
suggest that for every domain for which there is a law-formulating science, there exists
also a natural historical science—though the term "science" is generally applied only to
the former. I suggest that this is the best way to interpret, for instance, the current
controversy about the existence of a folk psychology alongside a nascent psychological
science (Wilkes, 1991): the former is a natural historical discipline on which we rely in
actual interactions with other people, while the latter is an intendingly law-formulating
discipline inspired by modern physics. Similarly, historiography may be practised as a
law-formulating discipline, as it is by Marxist historians, who formulate general prin-
ciples of political evolution that may or may not be precisely instantiated in the
development of a particular country; or as a natural historical discipline, as it is by the
Annales school, in which grand generalization is sacrificed for detailed knowledge of
circumscribed periods.
These observations suggest that a biological science of which the output consists of
laws of nature—a law-formulating counterpart to present-day biology may not be
unthinkable. Such a discipline would be dedicated to symbolizing aspects of the organic
world rather than giving detailed transcriptions of occurrences. This may sound like a
strange undertaking, but in fact the symbolizing approach has occasionally been
practised in the biological sciences. In the seventeenth century much effort was devoted
to constructing emblems of biological entities (Ashworth, 1990); and Romantic biology
aimed not to give accurate morphological descriptions of individual organisms, as does
mainstream taxonomy, but to identify the Bauplan or Urtyp of large classes of organisms,
such as the vertebrates (Lenoir, 1987, pp. 21-24). I suggest that these notions are best
seen as standing in a symbolic relationship to actual occurrences, and thus as analogous
to laws of nature.
If my account is accurate, then neither Comte's nor Smart's view of the division
between the law-formulating and the natural historical sciences can be endorsed.
Natural historical sciences are not sciences less advanced than law-formulating sciences,
as Comte held: on the contrary, sciences of the two sorts describe the world in different
ways, and should not be expected to evolve into one another. Nor is the choice between
practising a law-formulating and a natural historical science dictated by the subject
matter, as Smart suggested: a science of either sort may be practised in any domain.
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